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_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z, 
allows private gas companies to exercise the federal 
government’s power to take property by eminent domain, 
provided certain jurisdictional requirements are met.  This 
appeal calls on us to decide whether that delegation of power 
allows gas companies to hale unconsenting States into federal 
court to condemn State property interests.  
 
 PennEast Pipeline Company (“PennEast”) is scheduled 
to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  The 
company obtained federal approval for the project and 
promptly sued pursuant to the NGA to condemn and gain 
immediate access to properties along the pipeline route.  Forty-
two of those properties are owned, at least in part, by the State 
of New Jersey or various arms of the State.  New Jersey sought 
dismissal of PennEast’s condemnation suits for lack of 
jurisdiction, citing the Eleventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and, separately, arguing that PennEast 
failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA.  
Broadly speaking, the Eleventh Amendment recognizes that 
States enjoy sovereign immunity from suits by private parties 
in federal court.  New Jersey has not consented to PennEast’s 
condemnation suits, so those legal proceedings can go forward 
only if they are not barred by the State’s immunity.  The 
District Court held that they are not barred and granted 
PennEast orders of condemnation and preliminary injunctive 
relief for immediate access to the properties.  New Jersey has 
appealed. 
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 We will vacate because New Jersey’s sovereign 
immunity has not been abrogated by the NGA, nor has there 
been – as PennEast argues – a delegation of the federal 
government’s exemption from the State’s sovereign immunity.  
The federal government’s power of eminent domain and its 
power to hale sovereign States into federal court are separate 
and distinct.  In the NGA, Congress has delegated the former.  
Whether the federal government can delegate its power to 
override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity is, however, 
another matter entirely.  While there is reason to doubt that, we 
need not answer that question definitively since, even if a 
delegation of that sort could properly be made, nothing in the 
text of the NGA suggests that Congress intended the statute to 
have such a result.  PennEast’s condemnation suits are thus 
barred by the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.  We will 
therefore vacate the District Court’s order with respect to New 
Jersey’s property interests and remand the matter for the 
dismissal of any claims against New Jersey. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The NGA authorizes private gas companies to acquire 
“necessary right[s]-of-way” for their pipelines “by the exercise 
of the right of eminent domain[,]” if three conditions are met.  
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).  First, the gas company seeking to 
condemn property must have obtained a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity (a “Certificate”) from the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).  Id.  Second, it 
must show that it was unable to “acquire [the property] by 
contract” or “agree with the owner of property” about the 
amount to be paid.  Id.  Third and finally, the value of the 
property condemned must exceed $3,000.  Id. 
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In the fall of 2015, PennEast applied for a Certificate for 
its proposed 116-mile pipeline running from Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania to Mercer County, New Jersey (the “project”).  
After a multi-year review,1 FERC granted PennEast’s 
application and issued a Certificate for the project, concluding 
that, so long as PennEast met certain conditions, “the public 
convenience and necessity require[d] approval of PennEast’s 
proposal[.]”2  (App. at 226.)  
                                              
1 That review unfolded as follows: In February 2015, 
FERC published notice in the Federal Register and mailed it 
to some 4,300 interested parties.  FERC received over 6,000 
written comments in response and heard from 250 speakers at 
three public meetings.  The following summer, FERC issued a 
draft Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the project.  
It also published notice in the Federal Register and mailed the 
draft EIS to over 4,280 interested parties.  In response, FERC 
received more than 4,100 letters and heard from 420 (out of 
670) attendees at six public meetings.   
To address environmental and engineering concerns 
raised by the public, PennEast filed 33 route modifications.  
FERC then provided notice to newly affected landowners.  The 
following spring, FERC published a final EIS in the Federal 
Register.  That final EIS sought to address all substantive 
comments on the draft EIS.  FERC concluded that nearly all 
New Jersey parcels “subject to types of conservation or open 
space protective easements will generally retain their 
conservation and open space characteristics[.]”  (App. at 268.)  
 
2 Multiple parties, including New Jersey, challenged 
FERC’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia.  Petition for Review, Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, No. 18-1128 (D.C. Cir. filed 
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Certificate in hand, PennEast filed verified complaints 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, asking for orders of condemnation for 131 properties 
along the pipeline route, determinations of just compensation 
for those properties, and preliminary and permanent injunctive 
relief to gain immediate access to and possession of the 
properties to begin construction of its pipeline.  Forty-two of 
the 131 property interests PennEast sought to condemn belong 
to New Jersey or arms of the State (collectively, the “State” or 
“New Jersey”).3  The State holds possessory interests in two of 
the properties and non-possessory interests – most often, 
                                              
May 9, 2018).  That petition remains pending.  Several 
property owners also petitioned FERC for rehearing.  Those 
petitions were all “rejected, dismissed, or denied[.]”  (App. at 
31.) 
 
3 This appeal was filed on behalf of the State of New 
Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection (“NJDEP”), the State Agriculture Development 
Committee (“SADC”), the Delaware & Raritan Canal 
Commission (“DRCC”), the New Jersey Department of the 
Treasury, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, the 
New Jersey Water Supply Authority, and the New Jersey 
Motor Vehicle Commission.  It is undisputed that those various 
entities are arms of the State, and PennEast does not suggest 
that any of those entities should have anything less than 
Eleventh Amendment immunity to the same extent as the State 
of New Jersey. 
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easements requiring that the land be preserved for recreational, 
conservation, or agricultural use – in the rest.4   
 
After PennEast filed its complaints, the District Court 
ordered the affected property owners to show cause why the 
Court should not grant the relief sought.5  New Jersey filed a 
                                              
4 New Jersey owns those property interests as part its 
attempt to preserve farmland and open space in the State.  Cf. 
N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2 ¶¶ 6-7 (setting aside tax dollars for 
open space and farmland preservation).  For decades now, the 
State has operated preservation programs aimed at preserving 
such land.  For example, NJDEP’s “Green Acres” program 
authorizes the State to purchase, and help local governments 
purchase, land for recreation and conservation.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 13:8A-1 to -56.  New Jersey’s Agriculture Retention and 
Development Act also empowers the SADC to preserve 
farmland by buying such land in fee simple or by buying 
development easements to preserve the land for agricultural 
uses.  Id. §§ 4:1C-11 to -48.  The State also owns and maintains 
easements along the Delaware Canal through DRCC to protect 
the State’s water quality and vegetation.  Id. §§ 13:13A-1 to -
15; N.J. Admin. Code § 7:45-9.3.   
The State has spent over a billion dollars on its 
preservation efforts.  As of 2017, New Jersey had “helped to 
preserve over 650,000 acres of land[,]” and the “SADC and its 
partners had preserved over 2,500 farms and over 200,000 
acres of farmland.” (Opening Br. at 6 (citing App. at 94, 108).)   
 
5 The defendants include the State, as well as various 
townships, property trusts, utility companies, and individual 
property owners.     
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brief invoking its Eleventh Amendment immunity and arguing 
for dismissal of the complaints against it.  It also argued that 
PennEast had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements 
of the NGA by not attempting to contract with the State for its 
property interests.   
 
After hearings on the show-cause order,6 the District 
Court granted PennEast’s application for orders of 
condemnation and for preliminary injunctive relief.  At the 
outset, the Court rejected New Jersey’s assertion of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  It found that “PennEast ha[d] been 
vested with the federal government’s eminent domain powers 
and stands in the shoes of the sovereign[,]” making Eleventh 
Amendment immunity inapplicable.  (App. at 33.)  The Court 
reasoned that, because “the NGA expressly allows ‘any holder 
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity’” to 
condemn property, PennEast could do so here – even for 
property owned by the State.  (App. at 33 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717f(h)).)   
 
Next, the Court held that PennEast met the three 
requirements of the NGA, entitling it to exercise the federal 
government’s eminent domain power.  First, it found that 
PennEast holds a valid Certificate for the project.  Next, it 
                                              
6 The Court held three hearings to accommodate the 
large number of defendants involved.  Each hearing “generally 
proceeded the same way: First, PennEast was permitted to 
address the Court, followed by [property owners] represented 
by counsel.  Next, any property owner in attendance was 
permitted to address the Court, giving first priority to any party 
who had filed an opposition.  PennEast was permitted to 
respond.”  (App. at 29.) 
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concluded that PennEast had been unable to “acquire by 
contract, or [was] unable to agree with the owner of property 
to the compensation to be paid for” the affected properties.  
(App. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717f(h)).)  On that point, the Court rejected the State’s 
contention that PennEast had to negotiate with the holders of 
all property interests, including easement holders.  In the 
District Court’s view, § 717f(h) refers only to the “owner of 
[the] property[,]” meaning the owner of the possessory interest.  
(App. at 48 n.49.)  Finally, the Court found that the statute’s 
property value requirement was satisfied because PennEast had 
extended offers exceeding $3,000 for each property.  The Court 
thus granted PennEast’s request for orders of commendation.   
 
The District Court went on to hold that PennEast had 
satisfied the familiar four-factor test for preliminary injunctive 
relief.  To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must 
show “1) that there is reasonable probability of success on the 
merits, 2) that there will be irreparable harm to the movant in 
the absence of relief, 3) that granting the injunction will not 
result in greater harm to the nonmoving party, and 4) that the 
public interest favors granting the injunction.”  Transcon. Gas 
Pipe Line Co. v. Conestoga Twp., 907 F.3d 725, 732 (3d Cir. 
2018).  As to the first factor, the Court said that PennEast had 
already effectively succeeded on the merits, given that “the 
Court ha[d] found PennEast satisfied the elements of § 717f(h) 
and is therefore entitled to condemnation orders.”  (App. at 50.)  
As to the second factor, the Court found that, without an 
injunction, PennEast would suffer irreparable harm in the form 
of non-recoupable financial losses and construction delays.  
For the third factor, the Court noted that, while it had “carefully 
considered a wide range of arguments from Defendants 
regarding the harm PennEast’s possession will cause,” the 
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property owners would not be harmed “by the Court granting 
immediate possession” because they would receive just 
compensation.  (App. at 53, 55.)  Lastly, the Court was 
persuaded, especially in light of FERC’s conclusion about 
public necessity, that the project is in the public interest.  
Having found all four factors weighed in favor of granting a 
preliminary injunction, the Court ordered that relief.7  It then 
appointed five individuals to serve as special masters and 
condemnation commissioners to determine just compensation 
awards.   
 
New Jersey moved for reconsideration of the District 
Court’s denial of sovereign immunity and sought a stay of the 
District Court’s order to prevent PennEast from taking 
immediate possession of the State’s properties.  As described 
more fully herein, see infra Part III–B.1., it argued that, based 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), the United States lacks 
the constitutional authority to delegate to private entities like 
PennEast the capacity to sue a State.  The District Court denied 
that motion, concluding that Blatchford does not apply to 
condemnation actions brought pursuant to the NGA.   
 
The State timely appealed.  It also moved to stay the 
District Court’s order pending resolution of this appeal and to 
expedite our consideration of the dispute.  We granted that 
                                              
7 In addition to allowing PennEast to take immediate 
possession of the properties, the Court ordered that the U.S. 
Marshals could investigate, arrest, imprison, or bring to Court 
any property owner who violated the Court’s order.   
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motion in part, preventing construction of the pipeline and 
expediting the appeal.   
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
New Jersey contests jurisdiction in these condemnation 
actions, asserting here, as it did in the District Court, its 
sovereign immunity.  For the reasons that follow, we agree 
with it that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the suits insofar as they implicated the State’s property 
interests.  We, however, have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to review the denial of New Jersey’s claim of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Puerto Rico Aqueduct & 
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993); 
see Cooper v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“An order denying Eleventh Amendment immunity is 
immediately appealable as a final order under the collateral 
order doctrine.”).  And, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we 
have jurisdiction to review the grant of an injunction.   
 
We exercise plenary review over a claim of sovereign 
immunity.  Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 
2018).  We review the grant of a preliminary injunction for 
abuse of discretion but review de novo the legal conclusions 
underlying the grant.  McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland 
Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
  
 The Eleventh Amendment declares that: 
 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
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equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XI.  The States’ immunity from suit in 
federal court, however, “neither derives from, nor is limited by, 
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 713 (1999).  Rather, that immunity is “a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the 
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain 
today[.]”8  Id.  The Eleventh Amendment thus embodies a 
“recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain 
attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity.”  
Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146. 
 
Because of that immunity, States are not “subject to suit 
in federal court unless” they have consented to suit, “either 
expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’”9  Blatchford, 501 
U.S. at 779 (quoting Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp. v. 
Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 310 (1990)).  As part of “the ‘plan of the 
                                              
8 State sovereign immunity “includes both immunity 
from suit in federal court and immunity from liability[.]”  
Lombardo v. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Immunity from suit in federal court is known by 
the shorthand “Eleventh Amendment immunity.”  Id.  That is 
the only type of State sovereign immunity at issue here. 
 
9 That immunity extends to agents and instrumentalities 
of the State.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 
429 (1997); Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 
(3d Cir. 2016).   
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[Constitutional] convention[,]’” the States consented to suit by 
the federal government in federal court.  Blatchford, 501 U.S. 
at 779-82; see United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 641-46 
(1892); City of Newark v. United States, 254 F.2d 93, 96 (3d 
Cir. 1958) (“The consent of states to suits by the United States 
is implied as inherent in the federal plan.”).  The federal 
government thus enjoys an exemption from the power of the 
States to fend off suit by virtue of their sovereign immunity, an 
exemption that private parties do not generally have.10  Alden, 
527 U.S. at 755. 
 
New Jersey asserts that it is entitled to sovereign 
immunity from these condemnation suits.  It argues that the 
federal government cannot delegate its exemption from state 
sovereign immunity to private parties like PennEast and that, 
even if it could, the NGA is not a clear and unequivocal 
delegation of that exemption.  PennEast disagrees.  The 
company argues that a delegation of the federal government’s 
eminent domain power under the NGA necessarily includes the 
ability to sue the States and that concluding otherwise would 
frustrate the fundamental purpose of the NGA to facilitate 
interstate pipelines.     
 
A 
 
                                              
10 Citizens can, however, file suit against a State’s 
officers where the litigation seeks only prospective injunctive 
relief based on an ongoing constitutional violation.  Will v. 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  No one suggests that that 
doctrine of Ex parte Young is applicable here. 
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In view of PennEast’s argument, it is essential at the 
outset to distinguish between the two powers at issue here: the 
federal government’s eminent domain power and its exemption 
from Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Eminent domain is the 
power of a sovereign to condemn property for its own use.  
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371, 373-74 (1875).  The 
federal government can exercise that power to condemn State 
land in federal court.  United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 
240 (1946).  But its ability to do so is not due simply to “the 
supreme sovereign’s right to condemn state land.  Rather, it is 
because the federal government enjoys a special exemption 
from the Eleventh Amendment.”  Sabine Pipe Line, LLC v. 
Orange Cty., Tex., 327 F.R.D. 131, 140 (E.D. Tex. 2017).  
Thus, the federal government’s ability to condemn State land 
– what PennEast contends it is entitled to do by being vested 
with the federal government’s eminent domain power – is, in 
fact, the function of two separate powers: the government’s 
eminent domain power and its exemption from Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  A delegation of the former must not 
be confused for, or conflated with, a delegation of the latter.  A 
private party is not endowed with all the rights of the United 
States by virtue of a delegation of the government’s power of 
eminent domain. 
  
 PennEast tries to ignore that distinction, arguing that 
Congress intended for private gas companies to which the 
federal government’s eminent domain power has been 
delegated under the NGA to be able to condemn State property.  
Focusing on Congress’s intent to enable gas companies to build 
interstate gas pipelines, PennEast fails to adequately grapple 
with the constitutional impediment to allowing a private 
business to condemn State land: namely, Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. 
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That failure is a consequence of the easier road 
PennEast chooses, namely citing the NGA and asserting, in 
effect, that Congress must have meant for pipeline construction 
to go forward, regardless of the Eleventh Amendment.  That 
approach has the advantage of avoiding the difficulty of facing 
up to what the law requires to overcome Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.  As discussed below, see infra Part III–B.3., 
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under the 
Commerce Clause, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 59, 72-73 (1996), and because Congress enacted the NGA 
pursuant to that Clause, the statute cannot be a valid 
congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity.  To maintain 
these suits, then, PennEast had to offer a different answer for 
why its suits do not offend New Jersey’s sovereign immunity.  
But, as just noted, the only reason it gives – an argument of 
implied delegation of the federal government’s Eleventh 
Amendment exemption under the NGA – ignores rather than 
confronts the distinction between the federal government’s 
eminent domain power and its exemption from Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  Unfortunately for PennEast, that 
distinction is essential, and there are powerful reasons to doubt 
the delegability of the federal government’s exemption from 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
 
B 
 
Three reasons prompt our doubt that the United States 
can delegate that exemption to private parties.  First, there is 
simply no support in the caselaw for PennEast’s “delegation” 
theory of sovereign immunity.  Second, fundamental 
differences between suits brought by accountable federal 
agents and those brought by private parties militate against 
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concluding that the federal government can delegate to private 
parties its ability to sue the States.  Finally, endorsing the 
delegation theory would undermine the careful limits 
established by the Supreme Court on the abrogation of State 
sovereign immunity. 
 
1 
 
 Looking in more detail at the caselaw, it lends no 
credence to the notion that the United States can delegate the 
federal government’s exemption from state sovereign 
immunity.  In Blatchford, the Supreme Court dealt with this 
issue.  In that case, Native American tribes sued an Alaskan 
official for money allegedly owed to them under a state 
revenue-sharing statute.  Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 777-78.  
Relevant here, the tribes argued that their suit did not offend 
state sovereign immunity because Congress had delegated to 
the tribes the federal government’s ability to sue the States.  See 
id. at 783 (explaining the tribes’ assertion that, in passing 
28 U.S.C. § 1362, which grants district courts jurisdiction over 
suits brought by Indian tribes arising under federal law, 
Congress had “delegate[d]” the federal government’s authority 
to sue on behalf of Indian tribes “back to [the] tribes 
themselves”).  
 
The Court rejected that argument, expressing its 
“doubt … that sovereign exemption can be delegated—even if 
one limits the permissibility of delegation … to persons on 
whose behalf the United States itself might sue.”  Id. at 785.  
The Court explained why: “[t]he consent, ‘inherent in the 
convention,’ to suit by the United States—at the instance and 
under the control of responsible federal officers—is not 
consent to suit by anyone whom the United States might 
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select[.]”  Id.  The delegation theory, the Court explained, was 
nothing more than “a creature of [the tribes’] own invention.”  
Id. at 786. 
 
PennEast would have us dismiss Blatchford as “so 
distinguishable” as to be “useless by analogy.”  (Answering Br. 
at 41.)  As PennEast sees it, the statute at issue in Blatchford 
was a jurisdictional statute that did not confer any substantive 
rights on the tribes, while the NGA confers the substantive 
power of eminent domain on private parties.  But the Supreme 
Court’s statements in Blatchford had nothing to do with the 
jurisdictional nature of the statute at issue and everything to do 
with the Court’s deep doubt about the “delegation” theory 
itself. 
 
Courts of Appeals have been similarly skeptical that the 
federal government can delegate to private parties its 
exemption from state sovereign immunity – even when the 
private party seeks to assert the interests of the United States, 
rather than the party’s own.  The D.C. Circuit’s decision in U.S. 
ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute, Inc., 173 
F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999), is a case in point.  There, the court 
stated that “permitting a qui tam relator to sue a state in federal 
court based on the government’s exemption from the Eleventh 
Amendment bar involves just the kind of delegation that 
Blatchford so plainly questioned.”  Id. at 882.  That conclusion 
accords with others from our sister circuits.  See United States 
ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 
1999) (holding, in the qui tam context, that “the United States 
cannot delegate to non-designated, private individuals its 
sovereign ability to evade the prohibitions of the Eleventh 
Amendment”); see also Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 
898, 912 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that the federal 
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government could authorize a private plaintiff to sue on its 
behalf as “unpersuasive” based on Blatchford).  But cf. United 
States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer 
Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding that “the 
United States is the real party in interest” in qui tam suits and 
therefore such suits are not barred by the States’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity). 
 
While the Supreme Court and federal Courts of Appeals 
have not addressed the precise issue that we have 
here – whether condemnation actions under the NGA are 
barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity – the one reported 
district court decision to do so held that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is indeed a bar.  In Sabine Pipe Line, LLC v. Orange, 
County, Texas, the pipeline company plaintiff argued that, 
because the federal government could exercise its eminent 
domain power to condemn State property, there was “no reason 
to treat a delegation of the same authority any differently.”  327 
F.R.D. at 139.  The court disagreed.  It explained that, like 
PennEast’s arguments, the plaintiff’s “theory of the case 
erroneously assumes that by delegating one power [, that of 
eminent domain], the government necessarily also delegated 
the other [, the ability to sue the States].”  Id. at 140.  The court 
was careful not to conflate the two powers and, based on 
Blatchford, concluded that “a private party does not become 
the sovereign such that it enjoys all the rights held by the 
United States by virtue of Congress’s delegation of eminent 
domain powers.”  Id. at 141.”11  Id.   
                                              
11 PennEast is, of course, at pains to distinguish Sabine.  
It notes that the property at issue in Sabine had been privately 
owned at the time of the project’s approval and only later 
transferred to the State of Texas.  Thus, it argues, FERC’s 
20 
 
 
We are in full agreement.  Quite simply, there is no 
authority for PennEast’s delegation theory of sovereign 
immunity.  Indeed, the caselaw strongly suggests that New 
Jersey is correct that the federal government cannot delegate to 
private parties its exemption from state sovereign immunity. 
 
2 
 
Non-delegability makes sense, since there are 
meaningful differences between suits brought by the United 
States, an accountable sovereign, and suits by private citizens.  
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 785.  Suits brought by the United States 
are “commenced and prosecuted … by those who are entrusted 
with the constitutional duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed[.]’”  Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (quoting U.S. 
Const., art. II, § 3).  Private parties face no similar obligation.  
Nor are they accountable in the way federal officials are.  See 
id. at 756 (“Suits brought by the United States itself require the 
exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted 
against a State, a control which is absent from a broad 
delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.”).  
 
 
Those considerations are clearly in play in the eminent 
domain context.  There, the condemning party controls the 
                                              
predecessor was not aware that it was approving a project that 
implicated State-owned land and that the State opposed.  
Moreover, it asserts, the Sabine court did not consider the 
arguments pressed here.  But those arguments are unresponsive 
to the fundamental concern: whether the federal government 
can delegate its immunity exemption at all.   
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timing of the condemnation actions, decides whether to seek 
immediate access to the land, and maintains control over the 
action through the just compensation phase, determining 
whether to settle and at what price.  The incentives for the 
United States, a sovereign that acts under a duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed and is accountable to the 
populace, may be very different than those faced by a private, 
for-profit entity like PennEast, especially in dealing with a 
sovereign State.  In other words, the identity of the party filing 
the condemnation action is not insignificant.   
 
3 
 
There is, however, a way that Congress can subject the 
States to suits by private parties.  It can abrogate the sovereign 
immunity of the States.  The Supreme Court “ha[s] stressed, 
however, that abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets the 
fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal 
Government and the States, placing a considerable strain on the 
principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment 
doctrine[.]”  Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) 
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).  
Accordingly, the Court has held that Congress can abrogate the 
sovereign immunity of the States “only by making its intention 
[to do so] unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” in 
question.12  Id. at 228 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
                                              
12 The same kind of clarity is demanded for waivers of 
sovereign immunity.  See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 
473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) (“[W]e require an unequivocal 
indication that the State intends to consent to federal 
jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.  As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, ‘[c]onstructive 
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Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).  “Unmistakable” clarity is 
a high bar, and one that must be cleared without resort to 
nontextual arguments.  See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246 (“A 
general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of 
unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment.  When Congress chooses to subject the 
States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.”); see 
also Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230 (“If Congress’ intention is 
‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’ recourse to 
legislative history will be unnecessary; if Congress’ intention 
is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be 
futile, because by definition the rule of Atascadero will not be 
met.”). 
 
Moreover, Congress may abrogate state sovereign 
immunity only pursuant to a valid exercise of federal power.  
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.  Particularly relevant here, 
Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity under its 
Commerce Clause powers.  Id. at 59, 72-73.  Instead, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can abrogate 
sovereign immunity only when it acts pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.13  See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 
                                              
consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the 
surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it 
here.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)), 
superseded in other respects by Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7. 
 
13 For a relatively short period of time, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress could abrogate state sovereign 
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1989).  But that decision 
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445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress can abrogate state 
sovereign immunity pursuant to § 5); cf. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. 
v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 362 (2006) (declining to decide whether 
Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to 
the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution). 
 
What we take from those rules is that state sovereign 
immunity goes to the core of our national government’s 
constitutional design and therefore must be carefully guarded.  
Yet accepting PennEast’s delegation theory would 
dramatically undermine the careful limits the Supreme Court 
has placed on abrogation.  Indeed, “[t]o assume that the United 
States possesses plenary power to do what it will with its 
Eleventh Amendment exemption [by delegation] is to 
acknowledge that Congress can make an end-run around the 
limits that that Amendment imposes on its legislative choices.”  
SCS Bus., 173 F.3d at 883.  We are loath to endorse a never-
before-recognized doctrine that would produce such a result. 
 
4 
 
None of PennEast’s arguments for the delegability of 
the Eleventh Amendment exception are persuasive.  PennEast 
contends that “[t]here simply is no interference with state 
sovereignty when the United States itself has found that an 
interstate infrastructure project is both necessary and in the 
public’s interest”14 and that New Jersey “faces no real ‘harm’ 
                                              
was overruled.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66; see also infra 
note 20. 
 
14 In support of that proposition, PennEast relies on 
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 
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… given FERC’s plenary oversight over pipeline projects 
and their respective routes.”  (Answering Br. at 18-19.)  And, 
the company says, if the State is aggrieved, it “has recourse 
against the federal government” by way of challenging 
FERC’s decision to grant the Certificate.  (Answering Br. at 
22.)  Those arguments miss the point.  This case is not about 
whether the States have a chance to register their dissent or 
concerns about pipeline plans.  It is about whether the federal 
government can delegate its ability to hale fellow sovereigns 
into federal court and force the States to respond.  It is the 
“indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of 
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties” that New 
                                              
(1941).  There, according to PennEast, the Supreme Court held 
there was no Eleventh Amendment bar to a private party 
condemning State land because the dam project at issue had 
been authorized by Congress and so “there was ‘no 
interference with the sovereignty of the state.’”  The same 
reasoning applies here, it asserts, because the NGA authorizes 
PennEast to condemn property that FERC has found necessary 
to complete a project that is in the public interest.   
That misreads Guy.  In Guy, the State of Oklahoma sued 
to enjoin the construction of a congressionally authorized dam, 
as well as related condemnations.  Id. at 511.  While the 
respondents were private entities, federal government 
attorneys had instituted the condemnation actions.  Id. at 511 
n.2.  And the United States, not the dam company, was going 
to “acquire title to the inundated land.”  Id. at 511.  So while it 
is true that Oklahoma argued the dam would be a “‘direct 
invasion and destruction’ of the sovereign and proprietary 
rights of Oklahoma[,]” id. at 512, that was not because the State 
was being sued by private parties. 
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Jersey seeks to avoid.  Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146 
(citation omitted).  FERC’s blessing of the project does not 
speak to that problem in any way.15 
 
In the same vein, PennEast cites qui tam suits under the 
False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733,16 as 
proof “that the federal government can delegate its authority to 
sue” the States, provided the parties act on the government’s 
behalf and under its control, as PennEast says is the case here.  
                                              
15 Again, adopting PennEast’s position that federal 
agency involvement is enough to conclude that the United 
States has delegated its ability to sue the States to a private 
entity would fundamentally erode the Eleventh Amendment 
and the rules regarding abrogation.  If PennEast were correct, 
Congress could simply amend a statute pursuant to its 
Commerce Clause powers, give an agency some review 
responsibility, and thereby skirt any limit on Congress’s ability 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
 
16 The FCA authorizes private plaintiffs to sue “for the 
person and for the United States Government” against the 
alleged false claimant, “in the name of the Government.”  31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).  The FCA places several conditions on 
those suits.  Before suing, the private plaintiff must first notify 
the federal government and allow it to intervene.  
Id. §§ 3730(b)(2), (4).  The government can then decide 
whether to pursue the claim itself or leave it to the individual 
to pursue on behalf of and in the name of the government.  
Id. § 3730(b)(4).  At that point, the government can intervene 
in the suit only for “good cause.”  Id. § 3730(c)(3).  But the 
private plaintiff also cannot dismiss the suit without the 
consent of the government.  Id. § 3730(b)(1).  
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(Answering Br. at 36.)  We disagree.  To begin with, there is a 
split of authority on whether qui tam suits against States are 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Compare, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Milam, 961 F.2d at 50 (allowing qui tam suits to 
proceed based on that court’s view that the United States was 
the “real party in interest”), with United States ex rel. Foulds, 
171 F.3d at 289, 292-94 (concluding that qui tam suits are 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, based on Blatchford).  
While we take no position on that question now, even the cases 
upholding qui tam suits are of little help to PennEast.  As New 
Jersey highlights, courts upheld suits under the FCA because 
the suits are brought “in the name of the Government” based 
on “false claims submitted to the government”; the federal 
government receives most of any amount recovered; it can 
intervene in the suit after it has begun; and the case cannot be 
settled or voluntarily dismissed without the government’s 
consent.  United States ex rel. Milam, 961 F.2d at 48-49 
(citations omitted).  None of that is true here: PennEast filed 
suit in its own name; PennEast will gain title to the land; there 
is no special statutory mechanism for the federal government 
to intervene in NGA condemnation actions; and PennEast 
maintains sole control over the suits.  Most importantly, while 
the Supreme Court has “express[ed] no view on the question 
whether an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against 
a State would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment,” it has 
noted “there is ‘a serious doubt’ on that score.”  Vt. Agency of 
Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 
(2000) (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).  Accordingly, the attempted 
analogy to qui tam suits falls far short of supporting PennEast’s 
broad delegation theory. 
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PennEast is also incorrect that New Jersey’s sovereign 
immunity simply “does not apply” in condemnation actions 
because they are in rem proceedings.  (Answering Br. at 48.)  
The cases PennEast cites are confined – by their terms – to the 
specialized areas of bankruptcy and admiralty law.  See Tenn. 
Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 445, 450 
(2004) (concluding “a bankruptcy court’s discharge of a 
student loan debt does not implicate a State’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity” because “the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction is premised on the res, not on the persona”); 
California v. Deep Sea Res., 523 U.S. 491, 506 (1998) 
(“Although the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction 
over general title disputes relating to state property interests, it 
does not necessarily follow that it applies to in rem admiralty 
actions, or that in such actions, federal courts may not exercise 
jurisdiction over property that the State does not actually 
possess.” (emphases added)).17  In contrast, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that the general rule is “[a] federal court cannot 
summon a State before it in a private action seeking to divest 
                                              
17 Moreover, States can assert their sovereign immunity 
in in rem admiralty proceedings, when the State possesses the 
res.  See Aqua Log, Inc. v. Georgia, 594 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (“In Deep Sea Research, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the vitality of a series of cases dating back to the 
nineteenth century that hold a government can assert sovereign 
immunity in an in rem admiralty proceeding only when it is in 
possession of the res.”).  Here, of course, New Jersey possesses 
the property interests PennEast is seeking to condemn, so 
PennEast’s argument is wholly unsupported. 
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the State of a property interest.”18  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 289 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  And the Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that sovereigns can assert their immunity in in rem 
proceedings in which they own property.  Cf. Minnesota v. 
United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386-87 (1939); see also Fla. Dep’t 
of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 699 (1982) 
                                              
18 PennEast argues that Coeur d’Alene, in which the 
Supreme Court held that a tribe’s suit was barred by Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, does not show New Jersey is entitled 
to sovereign immunity because, in Coeur d’Alene, a state 
forum was available, the tribe was effectively seeking a 
“determination that the lands in question are not even within 
the regulatory jurisdiction of the State[,]” and submerged lands 
were at issue, a “unique” type of property under the law.  
(Answering Br. at 39 (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 282-
83).)  But those facts were only important for determining 
whether the tribe could bring suit pursuant to Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. at 155-56, which allows suits against state officials 
for injunctive relief.  Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 281-83.  The 
facts PennEast relies on had nothing to do with the general rule 
that the Eleventh Amendment applies when a State’s property 
is at issue.  See Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 281-82 (“It is 
common ground between the parties … that the Tribe could not 
maintain a quiet title suit against Idaho in federal court, absent 
the State’s consent.  The Eleventh Amendment would bar it.); 
id. at 289 (“The Tribe could not maintain a quiet title action in 
federal court without the State’s consent, and for good reason:  
A federal court cannot summon a State before it in a private 
action seeking to divest the State of a property interest.” 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).  
 
29 
 
(plurality).  New Jersey’s sovereign immunity remains very 
much a concern in these in rem proceedings.19  
                                              
19 The only support for PennEast’s position is Islander 
East Pipeline Co. v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 102 
FERC ¶ 61054 (Jan. 17, 2003).  In that final order, FERC 
concluded that the Eleventh Amendment “has no significance” 
for condemnation actions under the NGA because those suits 
are not “suit[s] in law or equity” against a State.  Id. ¶ 61132.  
FERC’s conclusion is an outlier and one that was reached with 
little, if any, analysis.  More importantly, it is flatly wrong.  
FERC did not deign to explain what type of suit a 
condemnation action under the NGA is, if not a suit at law or 
equity.  And the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment 
evidentially meant that term to be all-encompassing.  See 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 721 (“Each House spent but a single day 
discussing the [Eleventh] Amendment, and the vote in each 
House was close to unanimous.  All attempts to weaken the 
Amendment were defeated.” (citations omitted)); see also id. 
at 722 (“The text and history of the Eleventh Amendment also 
suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the 
original constitutional design.  Although earlier drafts of the 
Amendment had been phrased as express limits on the judicial 
power granted in Article III, the adopted text addressed the 
proper interpretation of that provision of the original 
Constitution[.]” (citations omitted)).  In any event, 
condemnation suits have historically been understood as suits 
in law.  See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999) (“Just compensation [for a 
taking] … differs from equitable restitution….  As its name 
suggests, … just compensation is, like ordinary money 
damages, a compensatory remedy.”); Kohl, 91 U.S. at 376 
(“The right of eminent domain always was a right at common 
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C 
 
Like the Supreme Court, our sister circuits, and the 
district court in Sabine, we are thus left in deep doubt that the 
United States can delegate its exemption from state sovereign 
immunity to private parties.  But we need not definitively 
resolve that question today because, even accepting the 
“strange notion” that the federal government can delegate its 
exemption from Eleventh Amendment immunity, Blatchford, 
501 U.S. at 786, nothing in the NGA indicates that Congress 
intended to do so.  “As a first inquiry, we must avoid deciding 
a constitutional question if the case may be disposed of on 
some other basis.”  Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 
95, 102 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
Recall that congressional intent to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity must be “unmistakably clear in the 
language of the statute.”  Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786 (citation 
omitted); see also United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 
n.13 (1946) (explaining that statutes granting eminent domain 
power to non-governmental actors “do not include sovereign 
powers greater than those expressed or necessarily implied, 
especially against others exercising equal or greater public 
powers” and that “[i]n such cases the absence of an express 
grant of superiority over conflicting public uses reflects an 
absence of such superiority”).  If delegation were a possibility, 
one would think some similar clarity would be in order.  But 
the NGA does not even mention the Eleventh Amendment or 
state sovereign immunity.  Nor does it reference “delegating” 
the federal government’s ability to sue the States.  It does not 
                                              
law.”).  We are therefore unpersuaded by FERC’s decision and 
owe it no deference. 
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refer to the States at all.  If Congress had intended to delegate 
the federal government’s exemption from sovereign immunity, 
it would certainly have spoken much more clearly.  Cf. 
Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 232 (rejecting the argument that a 
statute’s frequent references to the States were clear enough to 
abrogate sovereign immunity); Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden 
York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 223 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining 
courts must “assume that Congress does not intend to pass 
unconstitutional laws” given the “cardinal principle of 
statutory interpretation that when an Act of Congress raises a 
serious doubt as to its constitutionality, courts will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible 
by which the question may be avoided” (citation and 
alterations omitted)).  And while the NGA confers jurisdiction 
where the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000, “it would be 
quite a leap” to infer from that “grant of jurisdiction the 
delegation of the federal government’s exemption from the 
Eleventh Amendment.”  Sabine, 327 F.R.D. at 141.  In short, 
nothing in the text of the statute even “remotely impl[ies] 
delegation[.]”  Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786. 
 
Despite that, PennEast contends that, because the NGA 
does not differentiate between privately held and State-owned 
property, Congress intended to make all property subject to a 
Certificate-holder’s right of eminent domain.  The company 
also argues that the NGA is best understood in light of its 
legislative history and purpose, as well as by comparing the 
NGA to two other condemnation statues, both of which include 
explicit carve-outs for property owned by States.  Whatever the 
force of those arguments – and it is slight, at best20 – it does not 
                                              
20 As for the legislative history, it demonstrates that 
Congress intended to give gas companies the federal eminent 
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domain power.  See S. Rep. No. 80-429, at 2-3 (1947) 
(discussing need to grant natural gas companies the right of 
eminent domain to ensure the construction of interstate 
pipelines).  But it says nothing about Congress’s intent to allow 
suits against the States. 
And, as one of the amici, the Niskanen Center, argues, 
the history of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence explains the 
difference in language between the NGA and the two statutes 
PennEast cites, the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 
U.S.C. § 791a et seq., and the statute authorizing Amtrak to 
exercise eminent domain over property necessary to build rail 
lines, 49 U.S.C. § 24311(a) (the “Amtrak Act”).  When 
Congress passed the NGA and 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), in 1938 
and 1947, respectively, Congress “was legislating under the 
consensus that it could not abrogate states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause[.]”  
(Niskanen Br. at 14.)  Because of that, there was no reason to 
include a carve-out for State-owned property.  See Union Gas, 
491 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“It is impossible to say how many extant statutes would 
have included an explicit preclusion of suits against States if it 
had not been thought that such suits were automatically 
barred.”).   
Then came Union Gas, which permitted Congress to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Commerce 
powers.  Id. at 23 (plurality opinion).  Seven years later, 
however, in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court overruled 
Union Gas and affirmed that Congress can only abrogate state 
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66. 
The FPA and Amtrak Act, however, “were enacted or 
amended during [the] eight-year period” between Union Gas 
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change the text of the statute.  In the absence of any indication 
in the text of the statute that Congress intended to delegate the 
federal government’s exemption from state sovereign 
immunity to private gas companies, we will not assume or infer 
such an intent.  That is to say, we will not assume that Congress 
intended – by its silence – to upend a fundamental aspect of 
our constitutional design.  Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 
2494 (2018) (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a statutory 
scheme because “[i]t is implausible that Congress meant the 
Act to operate in this manner”); Guerrero-Sanchez, 905 F.3d 
at 223 (explaining doctrine of constitutional avoidance).  
Accordingly, we hold that the NGA does not constitute a 
delegation to private parties of the federal government’s 
exemption from Eleventh Amendment immunity.21 
 
D 
 
PennEast warns that our holding today will give States 
unconstrained veto power over interstate pipelines, causing the 
industry and interstate gas pipelines to grind to a halt – the 
precise outcome Congress sought to avoid in enacting the 
NGA.  We are not insensitive to those concerns and recognize 
that our holding may disrupt how the natural gas industry, 
                                              
and Seminole Tribe, a time during which Congress was careful 
to address state sovereign immunity when drafting legislation.  
(Reply Br. at 12.)  Given that context, the lack of similar 
language in the NGA is not as persuasive of PennEast’s point 
as the company would like. 
 
21 Because we hold that New Jersey is entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from these suits, we need not 
address the State’s alternative arguments. 
34 
 
which has used the NGA to construct interstate pipelines over 
State-owned land for the past eighty years, operates. 
 
But our holding should not be misunderstood.  Interstate 
gas pipelines can still proceed.  New Jersey is in effect asking 
for an accountable federal official to file the necessary 
condemnation actions and then transfer the property to the 
natural gas company.  Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 480 (2005) (discussing how broadly the Supreme Court 
has defined “public purpose” under the Takings Clause).  
Whether, from a policy standpoint, that is or is not the best 
solution to the practical problem PennEast points to is not our 
call to make.  We simply note that there is a work-around.   
 
PennEast protests that, because the NGA does not 
provide for FERC or the federal government to condemn the 
necessary properties, the federal government cannot do so.  But 
one has to have a power to be able to delegate it, so it seems 
odd to say that the federal government lacks the power to 
condemn state property for the construction and operation of 
interstate gas pipelines under the NGA.  In any event, even if 
the federal government needs a different statutory 
authorization to condemn property for pipelines, that is an 
issue for Congress, not a reason to disregard sovereign 
immunity.  To be sure, such a change would alter how the 
natural gas industry has operated for some time.  But that is 
what the Eleventh Amendment demands. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
insofar as it condemns New Jersey’s property interests and 
grants preliminary injunctive relief with respect to those 
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interests, and we will remand for dismissal of claims against 
the State. 
